← Valuations

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS)

Global Banking & Markets (IB, FICC, Equities) · Asset & Wealth Management ($4.1T AUS) · G-SIB · New York
Bank method · justified P/B on 10-yr normalized ROE · excess-return model · Gordon/total-payout & SOTP cross-checks · valued 2026-10-14
OVERVALUEDRISK: MEDIUM-HIGH
Price $870.31 · Base $622 · Price is +40% above base
Price (10/14 intraday)
$870.31
Base intrinsic value
$622
Bear → Bull range
$478 – $771
Key driver
Through-cycle ROE; price needs ~20.6% forever

The Take — Trim. A great quarter, priced as if every quarter will be this one.

Q3-26 (reported 10/13) was excellent and that is exactly the problem. EPS $17.01 vs $13.05 consensus, net revenue $18.7B (second-best ever), record Equities ($6.4B) on record prime/financing, IB fees $3.2B, AWM management fees a record $3.6B, AUS a record $4.10T with $97B of long-term inflows. Annualized ROE 18.7% (19.8% ex the $450M charitable gift); YTD 20.7%. The stock still fell — because at 2.34x book / 2.55x tangible, the market is already capitalizing a 20%+ ROE as permanent.

Normalize and the gap is wide. Goldman's 10-year reported ROE averages 11.7%; stripping TCJA, 1MDB and the Marcus exit lifts it to 12.9%; management's own through-the-cycle target is "mid-teens." Give them the full 15% — above the 10-yr record — at a 10.7% cost of equity and 3% growth, and the excess-return model, the Gordon/total-payout model and a sum-of-the-parts all land in the same $580–$625 neighbourhood. Even the bull case (18% ROE sustained, i.e. 2024–26 forever) is $771 — below today's price.

Reverse it: at $870 the stock requires a ~20.6% ROE in perpetuity, or — if you accept 15% — a cost of equity of ~8.5%, below where the 10Y Treasury plus any sane equity premium sits with Rf at 5.2%. On normalized payout the forward shareholder return is ~8.1% vs a 10.7% hurdle. You are being paid less than your cost of capital to own the peak of the cycle.

What the bulls get right (and why it's in the price): the mix shift is real — AWM is now ~25–29% of revenue with a 30% pre-tax margin target, $3.6B/qtr of sticky fees, alternatives at $491B AUS and a $750B 2030 target; consumer drag (Apple Card) is nearly gone. That is why base uses 15%, not the 12.3% raw average. But 71–74% of revenue is still GBM, and Equities/FICC/IB are running at record levels on a leverage- and financing-driven tape. Capital is also tighter than it looks: standardized CET1 fell to 12.4% from 14.4% at YE25 against an 11.4% requirement (SCB 3.4% locked through 9/30/27) — only ~100bp of headroom to keep funding $3B/qtr of buybacks.

Call: No new money above ~$700. Trim into strength; $771 (bull) is the ceiling of what fundamentals can defend. Accumulate below ~$620 (base), get aggressive below ~$520 (bear + margin). Holders who won't sell: overwrite — 30–45 DTE calls ~8–10% OTM (≈$950), or for a defined-risk bear view a bear call spread with the short strike ≥$960, well under the $1,154 July high, after post-earnings IV crush. Don't short outright: a capital-markets boom can carry ROE above 20% for several more quarters. Next print ~Jan 19, 2027.

Risk Profile — MEDIUM-HIGH

HIGHCapital-markets cyclicality — ~74% of 9M26 revenue is GBM. Long: deal/IPO volumes, trading volatility, prime balances. Short: a risk-off reversal; 2022–23 ROE fell to 7.5–10% from 23%.
HIGHMultiple compression — at 2.34x book, a de-rating to 1.6x (where 15% ROE justifies) is −33% with zero earnings miss. Short: rates (Rf 5.2%, Fed hiking bias raises COE).
MEDCapital headroom — CET1 12.4% vs 11.4% required; SLR 4.3%. Balance-sheet growth in financing is eating buyback capacity. Long: Basel endgame / eSLR relief.
MEDPrincipal investments & alts marks — on-balance-sheet PE/CRE (2023 writedowns) and incentive fees ($587M in Q3) are mark-to-market. Short: private-credit / PE valuation reset.
LOWCredit — provisions $368M in Q3 ($785M YTD) on a mostly wholesale, collateralized book; Apple Card held for sale.
What the "inventory" really is: a ~$1.8–1.9T (est.) trading and financing balance sheet (prime brokerage, repo, derivatives, warehouse lending) plus $3T+ of fee-earning client assets. The first is a levered call on market activity; the second is an annuity. The price pays annuity multiples for the whole thing.

Scenario values per share vs price

Bear$478Base$622Bull$771Prob-wtd$623Price$870
Excess-return model, CoE 10.7%, g 3%. Bear: ROE 15%→12.3% (raw 10-yr avg) · Base: 18%→15% (mgmt mid-teens; ≈10-yr ex-one-offs + mix shift) · Bull: 20%→18% (2024–26 run-rate sustained). Prob-weighted (25/50/25): $623. Dashed line = price.

Driver tornado — value/share from base $622

Normalized ROE ±2pt$533$710Cost of equity ±60bp$576$675Book growth yrs 1–5 (3% / 7%)$604$640Near-term ROE (yr1 16% / 20%)$606$638Terminal g ±50bp$612$633
Normalized ROE dominates — every ±1pt is ~$44/share. No single input swing reaches $870; the closest is +2pt ROE at $710.

Sensitivity — value/share: normalized ROE × cost of equity

Normalized ROE ↓ / CoE →9.5%10.1%10.7%11.3%11.9%
12.0%$577$529$489$454$424
13.5%$658$602$555$515$480
15.0%$739$675$622$576$536
16.5%$820$748$688$637$592
18.0%$901$822$755$698$648
20.0%$1,009$919$843$779$723
Red = >15% below price; amber = within 15%; green = above price. Price is only reached at ~18% ROE with CoE ≤9.5%, or 20% ROE at ~10.1%.

ROE history vs what the price implies

9.4%201611.0%201713.3%201810.0%201911.1%202023.0%202110.2%20227.5%202312.7%202415.0%202519.3%TTMPrice-implied sustained ROE 20.6%
Blue = reported ROE (2017 shown ex-TCJA), green = 2021 SPAC/IPO boom, orange = TTM. The dashed line is the ROE the stock needs forever. Goldman has exceeded it once in ten years.

Normalization worksheet — 10-yr through-cycle ROE

YearNet rev $BNI to common $MDil. EPSReported ROEAdj. ROEOne-offs
201630.67,08716.299.4%9.4%
201732.13,6859.014.9%11.0%TCJA $4.4B charge; ex-charge ROE 11.0%
201836.69,86025.2713.3%13.3%
201936.57,89721.0310.0%10.0%1MDB provisions
202044.68,91524.7411.1%14.4%1MDB settlement ~$3B litigation
202159.321,15159.4523.0%23.0%SPAC/IPO boom, PE marks
202247.410,76430.0610.2%10.2%
202346.27,90722.877.5%10.0%Marcus/GreenSky exit, CRE & PI writedowns
202453.513,52540.5412.7%12.7%
202558.316,30051.3215.0%15.0%record GBM $41.5B
TTM Q3-26≈74.1≈21,38369.57≈19.3%9M26 ROE 20.7% annualized; Q3 incl. $450M charitable gift (−1.1pt)
10-yr avg11.7%12.9%ex-TCJA only: 12.3% · 5-yr (2021–25): 13.7%
NI to common from SEC XBRL (NetIncomeLossAvailableToCommonStockholdersBasic). ROE and revenue as reported by GS. Adj. ROE adds back TCJA (2017 → 11.0%), 1MDB settlement (~+3.3pt 2020, est.) and the Marcus/GreenSky exit (~+2.5pt 2023, est.). FCF/FCF−SBC are not meaningful for a broker-dealer (operating cash flow is dominated by trading-inventory swings); capital return is shown in the bridge instead.
Revenue mix (why base is 15%, not 12.3%). 2025: GBM $41.5B (71%) / AWM $16.7B (29%). 9M26: GBM $41.7B (74%) / AWM $13.7B (24%) / Platform $0.8B. Q3-26: IB $3.2B, FICC $3.5B, Equities $6.4B (record), AWM mgmt fees $3.6B (record), private banking $0.8B, incentive fees $0.6B. AWM management fees alone now cover ~32% of firm opex — a genuine floor that the 2016–20 Goldman lacked. Sum-of-the-parts: AWM ~$19B rev × 28% margin → $4.1B NI × 18x = $75B; GBM normalized $40B rev (≈2025, below the 2026 run-rate) × 35% margin → $10.9B × 10.5x = $115B; less preferred → $609/share.

Why not FCFF

For a bank, debt is raw material, not financing: deposits, repo and trading liabilities are the product, so "enterprise value" and WACC have no stable meaning, and capex/working capital cannot be separated from trading inventory. Reinvestment is set by regulatory capital (CET1 vs RWA growth), not by capex. So we value equity directly on book: justified P/B = (ROE−g)/(CoE−g), an excess-return model (book + PV of (ROE−CoE)×book), and dividend/total-payout models as cross-checks.

Base case — excess-return model (per share)

YearROEBook (start)EPSPayout (div+buyback)Excess returnPV
Yr 1 (2027)18.0%$373$67.1$48.4$27.2$24.6
Yr 2 (2028)17.2%$391$67.5$47.9$25.6$20.9
Yr 3 (2029)16.5%$411$67.8$47.2$23.8$17.6
Yr 4 (2030)15.8%$431$67.9$46.4$21.8$14.5
Yr 5 (2031)15.0%$453$67.9$45.3$19.5$11.7
Terminal(15.0% − 10.7%) × book $476 ÷ (10.7% − 3%)TV $266$160
Value = book $372.64 + PV excess yrs 1–5 $89 + PV terminal $160 = $622. Terminal share of value 26% (well under the 70% flag — book does the heavy lifting). Book grows 5%/yr yrs 1–5 (retention net of buybacks); stable payout 1 − g/ROE = 80%. r (10.7%) > g (3%) ✓.
Cross-checks: justified P/B at 15% → 1.56x = $581 (bear 12.3% $450, bull 18% $726) · Gordon total-payout on normalized EPS $56 → $598 · SOTP $609 · dividend-only DDM ($20 DPS +8%/yr then 3%) $329 — the gap to the total-payout value is the buyback, so ~45% of value depends on GS continuing to repurchase ~$12B/yr, which CET1 headroom now limits. Reverse: price ⇒ sustained ROE 20.6% (ERM) / 21.0% (Gordon P/B), or CoE 8.5% at 15%.

Cost of equity

Risk-free (10Y UST, ~5.2% after Sept-2026 spike)5.20%
Mature ERP4.40%
Beta (investment-bank/broker bottom-up ~1.2; GS regression ~1.3–1.4)1.25
Cost of equity10.70%
Stable growth (≤ nominal GDP; below Rf)3.00%

Inputs & bridge

Book value / tangible book per common share (9/30/26)$372.64 / $341.43
P/B · P/TBV · trailing P/E (TTM EPS ≈ $69.57)2.34x · 2.55x · 12.5x
Q3-26 net revenue / net earnings / NI to common$18.68B / $5.29B / $5.12B
Q3-26 ROE / ROTE (annualized); YTD18.7% / 20.5%; 20.7% / 22.4%
Efficiency ratio Q3 / YTD; provision Q360.5% / 59.4%; $368M
CET1 standardized / advanced; SLR12.4% / 13.6%; 4.3%
CET1 requirement (SCB 3.4% through 9/30/27)11.4% → ~100bp headroom
Q3 capital return: buybacks (2.9M sh) + dividends$3.00B + $1.49B = $4.49B
Dividend ($5.00/qtr from Q3-26)$20/yr · 2.3% yield
Shares: basic 295.6M (Q3 avg); diluted ≈301M; market cap≈$254B
52-week range$740 – $1,154 (7/15/26)
Sources: GS Q3-26 earnings release & 8-K (10/13/26, SEC); GS Q4-25 call transcript (1/15/26, mid-teens through-cycle target, 30% AWM margin target, CET1 14.4% YE25); GS CCAR 2026 statement (SCB 3.4%, CET1 req 11.4%, $5.00 dividend); SEC XBRL NI to common 2015–25; Robinhood quotes/fundamentals/earnings 10/14/26. 2016–24 revenue/ROE as reported in GS annual releases; one-off ROE add-backs for 2020/2023 are estimates. Not investment advice.